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ABSTRACT 
LINDSAY KENNEDY: Thinking About You, Worrying About Me: Self-Other Differences 
in Risk Perception and the Influence of Numeracy and Emotions 
(Under the direction of Lawrence J. Sanna) 
 
Research on numeracy – the ability to make sense of numbers and statistics – has focused on 
the relationship between numeracy and general, other-focused risk estimates – with 
numeracy resulting in more accurate risk estimates – while less is known about numeracy 
and personal risk estimates. Because individuals view themselves as less at risk than their 
peers (Weinstein, 1982, 1987) and emotions play an important role in risk-related decisions 
(e.g., Loewenstein et al., 2001), it was hypothesized that worry would have a greater effect 
than numeracy on personal risk estimates, and numeracy would have a greater effect than 
worry on other-focused risk estimates. In Studies 1a and 1b, and in Study 2, participants were 
provided health statistics and estimated risk for themselves and an average other, and, in 
Studies 1b and 2, provided behavioral intentions for the self and behavioral recommendations 
for others. Worry and numeracy were measured in all studies, and manipulated in Study 2. 
Overall, worry was a better predictor of self-focused outcomes, while numeracy and worry 
were found to predict other-focused outcomes. Implications for the usefulness of numeracy 
training programs and patient-provider interactions are discussed.
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With health care costs continually rising (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007), it is more 
important than ever to understand the psychological factors that promote a healthy lifestyle. 
One such factor is personal health risk perception. Given the positive relationship between 
personal perceptions of risk and health-protective behaviors (e.g., Harrison, Mullen, & 
Green, 1992; McCaul, Bransetter, Schroeder, & Glasgow, 1996; Brewer, Chapman, Gibbons, 
Gerrard, McCaul, & Weinstein, 2007), understanding the factors that influence personal risk 
perception can be an important step toward increasing the likelihood of individuals engaging 
in preventative behaviors, rather than seeking treatment after it is too late. In this dissertation, 
I focus on two important factors related to personal risk perception: (a) understanding 
statistical concepts; and (b) affective experiences such as worry and fear. 
Numeracy and Risk Perception 
 To begin with the first factor, numeracy is defined as the ability to make sense of 
numbers and statistics (e.g., Peters, 2008; Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & 
Dickert, 2006). According to Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin 
(2008), there exists a widespread inability to understand numbers and statistics. They argue 
that this difficulty with numerical information can negatively affect perceptions of risk, and, 
ultimately, result in negative mental and physical health consequences, such as experiencing 
undue hope or worry, or choosing a suboptimal treatment option. For example, when 
2 
presented with the Basic Numeracy Assessment Scale (BNAS; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, 
& Welch, 1997), a sample of older female veterans struggled to convert 1% to 10 in 1,000 
(46% incorrect); struggled to convert 1 in 1,000 to 0.1% (80% incorrect); and struggled to 
correctly estimate the number of times a coin would come up heads in 1,000 flips (46% 
incorrect). Scores on the BNAS showed a strong linear relationship with accuracy in 
interpreting health-related risk information, such that those scoring lower in numeracy 
struggled to understand the risk reduction benefits provided by mammography screening 
(Schwartz et al., 1997). Additional studies have shown similar effects, with numeracy 
predicting accuracy in the health domain, such that those low in numeracy were less accurate 
in providing risk estimates (Black, Nease, & Tosteson, 1995; Davids, Schapira, McAuliffe, & 
Nattinger, 2004; Weinstein, Atwood, Puleo, Fletcher, Golditz, & Emmons, 2004; Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Black, & Welch, 1999; Wright, Whitwell, Takeichi, Hankins, & Marteau, 2009).  
 Further exacerbating this problem is the finding that this inability to make proper 
sense of numbers is not restricted to the average Joe and Jane; the highly educated (Lipkus, 
Samsa, & Rimer, 2001), medical providers, journalists, politicians, and the like have also 
been shown to struggle with accurately interpreting numerical information (Gigerenzer et al., 
2008). For example, when given base-rate information about the prevalence of breast cancer 
in a particular region, and the sensitivity and false-positive rate of mammograms, the 
majority of gynecologists sampled greatly overestimated the probability of a woman having 
breast cancer, given a positive mammogram. Although the most accurate choice was 
approximately a 10 percent chance, most chose either 81 or 90 percent, which is a huge 
overestimation. Findings such as these are especially disconcerting given the nature of the 
patient-doctor relationship and the recommendations and emotions that would likely follow 
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such an inaccurate estimate. However, after the gynecologists were given numeracy training, 
in which they learned how to translate complicated statistics into more understandable 
numbers, accuracy greatly improved. In the case of the gynecologists, accuracy jumped from 
21 percent (less than chance) to 87 percent (Gigerenzer et al., 2008). 
 Given this improvement following numeracy training, Gigerenzer and colleagues 
(2008) offer two general recommendations to combat collective statistical illiteracy. First, a 
stronger emphasis should be placed on numeracy training in education systems. They argue 
that it is imperative to begin teaching statistics as early as elementary school, alongside 
reading and writing, and as late as medical school. By doing so, they believe that societal 
numeracy levels can improve, thus providing individuals with the tools necessary to 
accurately interpret information about things such as prescription drugs, the effectiveness of 
treatment options, and personal risk levels. With this improved accuracy, we can not only 
make more rational health-related decisions and judgments, but also reduce the amount of 
money spent on unnecessary health care (e.g., surgical options, suboptimal prescription 
drugs, etc.). 
 Second, all risk information should be presented in straightforward, transparent ways. 
By this, Gigerenzer and colleagues (2008) mean that risk information should be presented in 
terms of absolute risks (risk reduces from 5 out of 1,000 to 4 in 1,000) instead of relative 
risks (risk reduces by 20%), and natural frequencies (10 out of 1,000 women have breast 
cancer; of these 10 women, 9 will have a positive mammogram) instead of conditional 
probabilities (probability of breast cancer is 1%; probability of a positive mammogram given 
breast cancer is 90%), for example. Gigerenzer et al. (2008) note that most numerical 
information found in medical journals, pamphlets, and websites is presented in 
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nontransparent, confusing ways, thus making an accurate interpretation even more difficult, 
especially for those already low in numeracy. 
 Taking this evidence into consideration, the importance of numeracy in risk 
perception cannot be understated. However, demonstrations of the beneficial effects of high 
numeracy, numeracy training, and transparent presentation of numerical information on 
health-related judgments have been mixed for self-focused judgments, or restricted to other-
focused judgments. Although studies have found evidence for high numeracy resulting in 
more accurate personal health judgments (Black, Nease, & Tosteson, 1995; Davids et al., 
2004; Woloshin et al, 1999; Wright et al, 2009), these effects are not consistent across 
judgments. For example, numeracy significantly predicted probability estimates of dying 
from breast cancer in the next 10 years, but not estimates of the relative risk reduction from 
undergoing breast cancer screening (Black, Nease, & Tosteson, 1995), while numeracy also 
significantly predicted comparative perceived risk, but not numerical estimates of risk 
(Woloshin et al., 1999). Similarly, Weinstein et al. (2004) found that numeracy significantly 
predicted personal risk perceptions before receiving numerical risk information, but not 
personal risk perceptions after receiving this information.  
Additional demonstrations of the benefits of numeracy, numeracy training, and 
transparent presentation of information on health-related judgments have been restricted to 
other-focused judgments. For example, in the case of the gynecologists, they were asked to 
provide estimates for a hypothetical patient (Gigerenzer et al., 2008). Focal judgments for 
other studies include breast cancer risk estimates for the average woman (Fagerlin, Zikmund-
Fisher, & Ubel, 2004), likelihood estimates of a mental patient committing an act of violence 
after discharge (Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000; Peters et al., 2006), and general 
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health judgments about hypothetical others (Keller & Siegrist, 2009; Garcia-Retamero & 
Galesic, 2010). Similarly, when Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, and Gigerenzer (2009) presented 
participants with icon arrays used to visually and transparently depict health-related statistics, 
the task of the participant was to answer a numeric question about another person (e.g., “How 
many of 1,000 people with symptoms of arterial disease might have a stroke or heart attack if 
they do not take aspirin?”). In all cases, participants were more accurate when they either (a) 
had higher levels of numeracy; (b) were trained to better understand statistics; or (c) were 
presented with understandable, transparent statistics – all of which make a strong case for the 
benefits of numeracy on other-focused judgments. 
 What is still unclear, however, is whether or not numeracy levels, numeracy training, 
and/or straightforward presentation of numerical information are powerful enough to 
overcome personal biases and experiences that may contribute to self-focused risk 
perceptions, such as a person’s emotions. Certainly presenting numerical risk information in 
a manner that is easily interpreted, like using absolute risks instead of relative risks, along 
with incorporating better statistical training into the education system are good – even great – 
improvements, but might the effects of numeracy and numeracy training be overshadowed by 
such biases and phenomena as unrealistic optimism, subjective interpretations of numerical 
risk, and experiences of emotions, such as worry and fear, when making judgments about the 
self? As Henry Clay (1777-1852) once wrote, “Statistics are no substitute for judgment.” 
Here, Clay is directly contrasting statistics and judgment. Perhaps individuals value their own 
intuition or subjective interpretations over numbers, making one’s level of numeracy simply 
less important when thinking about the self. To this point, self-other differences and the 
possibility that numeracy and numeracy training may differentially influence self- and other-
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focused perceptions of risk has been neglected in the literature, which leaves open the 
question of whether or not numeracy and numeracy training are as important for predicting 
self-focused perceptions of risk, as it is for predicting other-focused perceptions of risk. If 
numeracy and numeracy training are less important for judging self-focused perceptions of 
risk – the perceptions of risk that influence behavior – then the enthusiasm over and 
investment in numeracy training to improve health would not be justified. Addressing this 
important gap in the literature is the main objective of my dissertation. 
Self-Other Differences In Risk Perception 
 That judgments about the self often differ from judgments about others is a pervasive 
and well-known finding in social psychological literature, dating back to classic actor-
observer differences in attributions (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross, 1977). For example, Taylor 
and Brown (1988) have demonstrated that the majority of people believe that they are above 
average in most domains, which is, of course, statistically impossible. In addition, individuals 
are much more inclined to see cognitive biases operating in the judgments of others than in 
their own judgments, a phenomenon known as the bias blind-spot (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 
2002). Furthermore, as compared to others, people tend to view themselves as less 
susceptible to media influence (Douglas & Sutton, 2004); less influenced by alcohol in 
incidents of aggression (Graham & Wells, 2001); less likely to endure long periods of 
negative affect (Igou, 2008); and less vulnerable to victimization (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), 
just to name a few. 
 Most relevant to my dissertation, differences in risk perception have been found when 
estimating levels of risk for the self versus levels of risk for others. Weinstein (1982, 1987) 
found that most people rate themselves as less at risk than their peers for a wide array of 
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health problems. This discrepancy was most pronounced when the focal health problem was 
preventable in nature, presumably because individuals were better able to think about 
behaviors they could engage in – more easily than thinking about the behaviors of others – 
that would improve the possible outcome (Weinstein, 1980, 1987).  
The tendency for people to believe they are more likely to experience positive events 
and less likely to experience negative events than their peers has been labeled unrealistic 
optimism (Weinstein, 1980). Like many other biases in reasoning, researchers have searched 
for ways to overcome unrealistic optimism; however, these attempts have only been 
successful in producing slight reductions in this bias. When provided with information about 
a peer relevant to the judgment at hand (e.g., factors influencing risk of developing lung 
cancer), participants narrowed the gap between estimates of the self and peer, but the self-
other differences remained significant (Weinstein, 1980). In addition, Weinstein and Klein 
(1995) attempted to reduce unrealistic optimism using four different debiasing interventions, 
including asking participants to generate lists of personal factors that would likely increase 
their risk of a health problem, only to find that an optimistic bias remained in all four cases. 
One mode of information presentation that has been found to be effective in reducing the 
optimistic bias – by way of raising personal risk perceptions – is the use of personal 
testimonials or narratives. Personal narratives conveying health information have been found 
to be more effective at increasing a sense of personal risk, and thus resulting in a greater 
likelihood of engaging in health-protective behaviors, than objective statistics conveying 
health information (de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008), again suggesting possibly important self-
other differences.  
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Experienced Affect or Emotions and Risk Perception 
  There are still other ways in which judgments about the self are likely to differ from 
judgments of others. In particular, when making judgments about the self, experiences of 
affect or specific emotions are likely to be salient and used as information. For example, one 
prominent approach to understanding the relationship between affect or specific emotions 
and judgments is the feelings as information hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003). 
According to this hypothesis, general mood states, specific emotions, or simply general 
subjective states (Schwarz & Clore, 2007) are often relied upon as meaningful sources of 
information when making judgments, even if the source of the feeling is unrelated to the 
judgment at hand (Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For example, individuals were 
more likely to report being happy and satisfied in their lives after just recalling a happy 
memory versus an unpleasant memory (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Of particular relevance to my dissertation, the risk as feelings hypothesis 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) posits that reactions to risk possibilities are 
either cognitive or emotional in nature, an approach akin to the Common Sense Model of 
illness self-regulation (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980). Although cognitive and 
emotional reactions may influence one another, they may also lead to differing conclusions. 
A useful example provided by Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) involved changes in 
probability of winning the lottery, and how a change in probability impacts cognitive 
appraisals, but not emotional ones. The authors suggest that when the odds of winning the 
lottery change from 1 in 10,000,000 to 1 in 10,000 this change in probability is unlikely to 
change the personal feeling associated with the possibility of winning (e.g., how much better 
they feel their life would be). Applying this reasoning to the health context, a change in the 
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likelihood of contracting genital herpes may change the cognitions regarding the magnitude 
of the risk, but this change in likelihood probably does not change the negative affective 
reaction that accompanies the thought of having genital herpes. Furthermore, when cognitive 
and emotional reactions to risk diverge, Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that behavior is 
primarily driven by the emotional reactions. 
 In terms of specific emotions, worry is one emotion that is commonly present when 
talking about risk perception. As defined by Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, and DePree 
(1983), worry is a “chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental problem solving 
on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative 
outcomes. Consequently, worry relates closely to fear process” (p. 10).  
 Regarding health, worry has been found to be a significant predictor of health-related 
and protective behaviors, and sometimes operates upon beliefs and behaviors in ways 
independent of risk perceptions. For example, Cameron and Diefenbach (2001) found that 
the desire to undergo genetic testing was significantly predicted by worry about developing 
breast cancer, such that higher levels of worry were associated with a greater willingness to 
undergo genetic testing; however, perceived risk of developing breast cancer did not 
significantly predict the same outcome. Moreover, worry was positively associated with the 
belief that genetic testing could have a negative emotional impact, while risk perception was 
negatively associated with the same beliefs. Similarly, Chapman and Coups (2006) found 
that anticipated worry better predicted vaccination behavior than perceptions of risk, and 
even mediated the effect of perceptions of risk on vaccination behavior. 
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Given its relationship to worry (Borkovec, et al., 1983), fear has also been found to 
influence risk estimates. Specifically, fear has been linked to increases in estimates of risk 
(Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), which speaks to the popularity of fear appeals 
in public health campaigns. Fear appeals have the ability to influence attitudes and behaviors 
through an emotional pathway, and are thought to be an effective means to influencing 
health-related behavioral intentions and behaviors because the arousal of fear also activates 
the need to manage this fear (Leventhal, 1971). If the fear appeal contains efficacious 
information on how to avoid the threat, then recipients of the appeal are likely to manage 
their fear through the adoption of the message’s recommendations (Witte, 1992). Fear 
appeals can also be effective if they increase vulnerability felt by the recipient (Witte & 
Allen, 2000). The effectiveness of such an emotional approach has yet to be compared to the 
effectiveness of the more cognitively based numeracy training approach. And, given that fear 
appeals are commonly used in public health campaigns and that the popularity of numeracy 
training is growing rapidly, a direct comparison between these two approaches could prove 
very useful in terms of determining which approach to improving health-related behaviors is 
more effective and efficient.
 CHAPTER 2 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
 In sum, extant research on numeracy has focused on the relationship between 
numeracy and general assessments of risk, which tend to be other-focused, while less is 
known about the relationship between numeracy and personal assessments of risk. This is a 
gap in the numeracy literature, given that individuals consistently view themselves as less at 
risk than their peers, and that affect and specific emotions play an important role in risk-
related decision making. Because personal risk perceptions may be more affectively driven, 
and may be relatively unaffected by one’s level of numeracy, it is possible that the benefits of 
numeracy training have been overstated and that societal efforts to teach statistical reasoning 
may not result in the positive health outcomes that many are hoping for (e.g., Gigerenzer et 
al, 2008). For example, if numeracy and numeracy training don’t influence personal risk 
perceptions, then these factors may also be unlikely to influence personal health behaviors, 
which greatly reduces the importance of this cognitively driven approach. 
The studies outlined in my dissertation aim to integrate research on numeracy, self-
other differences in risk perception, and emotions in order to better understand the 
importance of cognitive and emotional factors in differing types of risk perceptions. If 
numeracy and numeracy training are found to influence other-focused perceptions of risk, but 
not self-focused perceptions of risk, as I hypothesize, then it may be the case that the benefits 
of numeracy training are restricted to populations that regularly estimate risk for other 
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people, such as medical providers and counselors, and may not be the most effective 
approach for improving the health of the general public. By having a better understanding of 
the roles of both numeracy and emotions in personal risk perception, in particular, we may 
better know how to intervene – cognitively or emotionally – to influence personal risk 
perceptions, and thus behavioral outcomes.  
In the first pair of studies (Studies 1a and 1b), I examine the hypothesis that numeracy 
levels are more important than worry on other-focused risk estimates, whereas worry is more 
important than numeracy levels on self-focused risk estimates is tested using an online 
survey. In this survey, worry and numeracy were measured and participants were asked to 
estimate risk for both themselves and the average college student. In the second study, I build 
upon the initial study by incorporating behavioral measures to see which factor – numeracy 
or worry – is more predictive of behavioral intentions and behavioral outcomes. Finally, 
Study 2 attempts to manipulate levels of numeracy and worry – through a numeracy training 
intervention and the use of fear appeals, respectively – and will again measure self- and 
other-focused perceptions of risk, behavioral intentions, and behavioral outcomes.
 CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1A 
 
 The main purpose of this study was to provide an initial examination of the influence 
of experienced emotion (in particular, worry) and numeracy levels on judgments of risk for 
the self versus others. To address one of the recommendations to improve risk perceptions 
made by Gigerenzer et al. (2008), risk-relevant numerical information was presented using 
either transparent (e.g., absolute risks) or nontransparent (e.g., relative risks) framing; this 
difference in framing of risk information, or transparency, was a between-subjects variable. 
Focus of the judgment was a within-subjects variable, such that all participants provided risk 
estimates for the self and the average college student on four different health scenarios: 
melanoma, car accident, genital herpes, and type 2 diabetes. I hypothesized that numeracy 
level would have a greater effect than worry on other-focused risk estimates, whereas worry 
would have a greater effect than numeracy level on self-focused risk estimates. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 75 undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. In exchange for their 
participation, participants received credit toward partial fulfillment of a class research 
requirement. Given that the health data presented to the participants were applicable up to 
age 29, participants aged 30 and above were not included in the analyses. This inclusion 
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criterion resulted in a final sample size of 70, ranging in age from 18 to 29, with an average 
age of 20 years. 
Procedure 
 The general procedure for this study was as follows: Participants accessed an online 
Qualtrics survey via the University’s participant pool website, and were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: nontransparent vs. transparent presentation of information 
(referred to from this point as transparency). Following standard informed consent 
procedures, participants answered questions about four different health-related events: 
melanoma, type 2 diabetes, genital herpes, and getting into a car accident. Participants 
responded to questions aimed to assess their worry about each of the four events and, 
following a short filler-task, their perception of risk for the self and others for each of the 
events. They also answered a set of questions about their subjective interpretation of their 
level of risk and how at risk they believed themselves to be relative to the average college 
student for all four events. Next, they answered a set of questions that assessed their 
numeracy level. Finally, participants responded to some demographic questions. The precise 
measures used are presented and described below. The average college student was chosen as 
the target of the other-focused condition, so as to provide a comparison group that was 
similar to the participants and pose a more stringent test of self-other differences.  
Materials 
Worry 
The survey began by asking participants to indicate how bothered they were by 
thinking about and how worried they were about experiencing each of the four health-related 
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events (McCaul, Mullens, Romanek, Erickson, & Gatheridge, 2007). Responses to each 
question were provided using a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 6 (Extremely).  
Numerical Risk Estimates 
 In order to assess numerical perceptions of risk, all participants read the same four 
scenarios containing factual information about preventable health-related events. Statistical 
information gathered from the Skin Cancer Foundation (melanoma; 2010a), the Virginia 
Tech Transportation Institute (car accident; 2009), the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (genital herpes; 2007), and the National Diabetes Education Program (type 2 
diabetes; 2004) and was presented in either a nontransparent or transparent manner. The 
scenarios are presented in their entirety in Appendix A. Below is a sample scenario, 
presented transparently and nontransparently, respectively, with differences bolded: 
 Melanoma (the most serious type of skin cancer) is the most common form of 
cancer for young adults 25-29 years old and the second most common form of 
cancer for adolescents and young adults 15-29 years old. One in 55 people will 
be diagnosed with melanoma during their lifetime. A person’s risk for melanoma 
doubles if he or she has had five or more sunburns at any age. 
 
 Melanoma (the most serious type of skin cancer) is the most common form of 
cancer for young adults 25-29 years old and the second most common form of 
cancer for adolescents and young adults 15-29 years old. Approximately 1.8% of 
people will be diagnosed with melanoma during their lifetime. A person’s risk for 
melanoma increases by 100% if he or she has had five or more sunburns at any 
age. 
 
 Each of the four scenarios was presented twice, and all eight presentations were 
randomized. For one presentation of each scenario, participants were asked to provide their 
perception of risk for themselves; for the other presentation, participants were asked to 
provide their perception of risk for the average college student. These estimates were 
provided by answering questions that tapped into the three dimensions of perceived risk: 
likelihood, susceptibility, and severity (Brewer, et al., 2007).  
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The first question addressed perceived likelihood and asked, for example, “What is 
the likelihood of you [the average college student] being diagnosed with melanoma in your 
lifetime?” Following this estimate, participants were asked, “How susceptible do you think 
you are [the average college student is] to developing melanoma in your lifetime?” For these 
two questions, participants were asked to provide an estimate ranging from 0% (Not at all) to 
100% (Extremely). A final question assessed severity by asking, “How serious a disease do 
you think melanoma is?” Participants provided an estimate between 0 (Not at all) and 100 
(Extremely).   
Subjective and Relative Risk Estimates 
 Subjective risk was measured through questions such as, “How at risk do you think 
you are for developing melanoma in your lifetime?” Responses were provided using a seven-
point scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all at risk) to 6 (Very much at risk). Participants 
responded to one question per event.  
 Risk level relative to the average college student was also measured through one 
question for each event. For example, participants were asked the question, “How do you 
think your chance of getting melanoma in your lifetime compares with that of the average 
college student?” Responses were provided using a seven-point scale, ranging from much 
lower than average to much higher than average, with average as the midpoint. 
Numeracy Level 
 Numeracy level was assessed through a series of 11 questions developed by Lipkus, 
Samsa, and Rimer (2001). A sample question reads as follows, “If Person A’s risk of getting 
a disease is 1% in 10 years, and Person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?” An 
individual’s numeracy level reflected how many questions were answered correctly, with a 
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possible range of 0 to 11; the actual range of scores was 4 to 11, with an average score of 
9.09 questions correct. This full measure is presented in Appendix B. 
Data Analysis 
 Multivariate multiple regression in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 1998) was used to 
estimate the effects of transparency (framing of information), worry, numeracy level, and all 
of the two- and three-way interaction terms on the estimates of self- and other-focused risk. 
Worry was calculated by averaging responses to worry questions for the melanoma, car 
accident, and type 2 diabetes scenarios ( = .79). Similarly, self- and other-focused risk 
estimates were calculated by averaging risk estimates from the melanoma, car accident, and 
type 2 diabetes scenarios (s = .62 and .84, respectively).1  
Four different models were tested for the data: one containing only main effects, one 
containing main effects plus the interactions between transparency and numeracy level and 
transparency and worry, one containing main effects plus all two-way interaction terms, and 
one containing the above plus the three-way interaction term. Chi-square difference tests 
were used to identify the best fitting model for the data. Results are presented for the best 
fitting model only. In addition, a hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to analyze 
                                                 
1 The genital herpes scenario was dropped from analyses, because it did not react in the same 
way as the other three scenarios. When analyzing the genital herpes scenario separately, there 
were no significant effects of transparency, worry, or numeracy level on self-focused 
numerical or subjective risk, and there was only a marginally significant effect of numeracy 
on other-focused numerical risk. In addition, there were significant two-way interactions 
between condition and worry (self-focused numerical and subjective risk) and condition and 
numeracy (self-focused subjective risk) that did not replicate in any other scenarios. Given 
that the correlation between how worried participants were about getting genital herpes, and 
how bothered they were by thinking about getting genital herpes was low and only 
marginally significant, with ratings of the latter being much higher than the former, it is 
possible that this different pattern of results were found due to low levels of sexual activity in 
this sample. 
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the effects of transparency, worry, numeracy level, and all of the interaction terms for the 
aforementioned variables on subjective risk. 
 Although no specific predictions were made for two- and three-way interactions 
among transparency, numeracy level, and worry, these interaction terms were included in all 
regression analyses for exploratory purposes, and were retained if they significantly 
contributed to explained variance.  
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables of interest are 
presented in Table 1. Numeracy level and worry were centered for all regression analyses. 
Although not central to my hypothesis, there was an optimistic bias present, such that self-
focused numerical risk estimates were significantly lower than other-focused numerical risk 
estimates, t (69)= -7.74, p < .001, and the average relative risk estimate was lower than 
average (lower than the midpoint of 4 on the scale), M = 3.17, SD = .81. 
Effects on Numerical Risk Estimates 
Again, multivariate multiple regression was used to examine the effects of 
transparency, worry, numeracy level, and the two- and three-way interactive effects of 
transparency, worry, and numeracy level on both self- and other-focused estimates of risk. 
The results from the best-fitting model – the model containing only main effects – are 
presented in Table 2.  
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between self- and other-focused 
risk estimates remained significant, B = 106.93, SE = 27.11, p < .001. Beginning with self-
focused risk estimates, there was a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in 
worry resulted in a 4.51-unit increase in self-focused risk. There was also a marginally 
19 
significant effect of numeracy level, p = .10, such that a 1-unit increase in numeracy level – 
getting one additional question correct on the numeracy measure – resulted in a 1.36-unit 
decrease in self-focused risk estimates. There was no significant effect of transparency. 
Although a marginal effect of numeracy level was not expected, the finding that worry was a 
significant predictor for self-focused numerical risk estimates supports my hypothesis. Also 
supporting my hypothesis, for other-focused risk estimates, there was a significant effect of 
numeracy level, such that a 1-unit increase in numeracy level resulted in a 2.46-unit decrease 
in other-focused risk, but there were no significant effects of transparency or worry. 
Effects on Subjective Risk Estimates 
Hierarchical linear regression was used to test the effect of transparency, worry, 
numeracy level (Step 1), the two-way interactions between all three variables (Step 2), and 
the three-way interaction term (Step 3) on subjective risk estimates. Linear regression was 
used in this case, instead of multivariate multiple regression, because subjective risk was 
only asked the self, and not for the self and the average college student. Only results from 
Step 1 are reported, as the change in R2 beyond Step 1 was not significant. Results from Step 
1 are presented in Table 3. 
For subjective estimates of personal risk there was a significant effect of worry, 
such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .26-unit increase in subjective risk. There 
were no significant effects of transparency or numeracy level. The significant effect of 
worry, coupled with the nonsignificant effect of numeracy level, supports my hypothesis. 
Summary 
The results from Study 1a are strongly supportive of my hypothesis that the effect 
of worry would be greater than the effect of numeracy level on self-focused risk estimates, 
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while the effect of numeracy level would be greater than the effect of worry on other-focused 
risk estimates. Worry, but not numeracy level, significantly predicted both self-focused 
numerical and subjective risk estimates, whereas numeracy level, but not worry, significantly 
predicted other-focused numerical risk estimates. Interestingly, transparency did not play a 
significant role in predicting any of the three types of risk estimates. It should be noted, 
however, that the degree to which the data were perceived by participants to be transparent or 
nontransparent was not measured, so strong conclusions should not yet be drawn about the 
general lack of effect of the transparency manipulation. 
Overall, it does not appear to be the case that the potentially beneficial effects of 
numeracy level on risk perceptions extend to perceptions of risk for the self, nor does it 
appear to be the case that the transparency, or lack thereof, of numerical data played an 
influential role on either type of risk perception. Taken together, the data from Study 1a call 
into question whether or not the recommendations made by Gigerenzer and colleagues 
(2008) are universally applicable. As Study 1a highlights an important boundary condition to 
the effects of numeracy level – a restriction to other-focused risk estimates – it seems that 
efforts to increase numeracy levels may be more important and influential for those 
individuals who regularly estimate risk for other people, such as medical providers and 
counselors. In addition, given that personal risk estimates are likely to influence personal 
health behavior more than other-focused risk estimates, it is unlikely that numeracy levels 
will have beneficial effects on behavior as suggested by Gigerenzer, et al. (2008). To test 
this, behavioral intentions and behavioral outcomes were added to the next study.
 CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 1B 
 
 Study 1b was conducted as a revision and extension of Study 1a. The general 
procedure was largely unchanged, though several key changes were made, some of which 
address potential shortcomings of Study 1a. These changes include modifications of the 
scenarios used (only melanoma and type 2 diabetes; both presented in terms of lifetime risk), 
an additional pilot test of the transparency manipulation, the addition of measures, such as 
other-focused subjective risk and behavioral intentions and recommendations for others, and 
an increase in the sample size. 
Scenario Changes 
The first important change was in regard to the presented scenarios. Study 1a 
presented participants with data for four different health-related events, and these data 
differed in terms of time frame. For example, while participants were asked to estimate their 
risk of developing melanoma over their lifetime, they were asked to estimate their risk of 
contracting genital herpes over the next year. In Study 1b, the scenarios for each topic 
referenced the same time frame: lifetime risk. This time, only the melanoma and type 2 
diabetes scenarios were used. The car accident scenario was dropped because it was not 
directly health-related, and the genital herpes scenario was dropped, because of the 
possibility that the data did not apply to a sizeable number of participants (i.e., those who are 
not sexually active).  
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Additional Pilot Test of Transparency 
Given the lack of significant effects for transparency in Study 1a, a pilot test was run 
to test whether or not this manipulation is producing the intended effect on the 
interpretability of health data, in order to draw more confident conclusions from significant – 
or a lack of significant – effects upon the dependent measures. To test this manipulation, a 
sample of 34 undergraduates from the UNC Participant Pool were provided with either 
transparent or nontransparent statistics regarding melanoma and type 2 diabetes and asked to 
compare their risk for developing each to their risk for developing hypertension by both 
indicating which risk was higher and numerically estimating how much higher they believed 
that risk to be. In the case of melanoma, the risk of developing hypertension (18.38%) was 
greater than the risk of developing melanoma (2.72%); in the case of type 2 diabetes, the risk 
of developing type 2 diabetes (30.83%) was greater than the risk of developing hypertension 
(18.38%).  
Although no significant differences in accuracy were found between the two 
conditions for either scenario (using logistic regression and t-tests), the percentages and 
means were in the expected directions. Regarding participants’ choices of which risk was 
higher, 62.50% of participants in the transparent condition versus 44.44% of participants in 
the nontransparent condition provided correct responses for the melanoma scenario, while 
56.25% participants in the transparent condition versus 44.44% of participants in the 
nontransparent condition provided correct responses for the type 2 diabetes scenario. 
Regarding their numerical estimates of the differences between the two risks, the mean 
estimates for each scenario were more accurate when the data was presented transparently. 
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For melanoma, the mean error in the transparent condition was 22.84, while the mean error in 
the nontransparent condition was 25.02. For type 2 diabetes, the mean error in the transparent 
condition was 12.36, while the mean error in the nontransparent condition was 25.58.  
Despite the fact that there were no significant differences in participant accuracy 
based on how transparently the information was presented, the scenarios used in the pilot 
study were retained for the full study. This was because the framing of the scenarios was 
highly representative of the transparent-nontransparent distinction made by Gigerenzer and 
colleagues (2008), and because the inability to find significant effects of transparency in the 
first study and in follow-up pilot studies may be reflective of a real lack of effect for this 
transparent-nontransparent distinction. The final version of each scenario framing is 
presented in Appendix C.  
Added Measures 
 Several new measures were also included in this follow-up study. Other-focused 
subjective risk estimates were added to more fully examine the impact of numeracy level and 
worry on subjective interpretations of risk estimates, and how these factors may differentially 
impact estimates for the self versus other. Also, because level of perceived control or 
preventability has been found to increase the magnitude of self-other differences in risk 
perception (e.g. Weinstein, 1980), questions assessing perceived controllability of each 
health-related event were also included. Although all of the events included in Study 1a were 
considered relatively preventable in nature, participants’ perceptions of controllability were 
not explicitly measured. The mood clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey, 
Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) was also included in order to test whether or not 
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the ability to understand emotional experiences would affect the relative influence of 
numeracy level and worry on the outcome measures.  
In addition, questions aimed to assess participants’ specific behavioral intentions 
related to each disease were included after participants provided self and other risk estimates 
for both health-related events. Participants responded not only to questions about protective 
and detective behaviors, but also to questions about willingness to pay for treatment and 
willingness to undergo genetic testing. For each group of questions, participants provided 
responses for themselves, as well as behavioral recommendations for the average American. 
The inclusion of these important questions was to allow for the examination of the influence 
of numeracy level and worry on behavioral intentions and behavioral recommendations for 
others. It was also to allow for the simple comparison of the predictive value of numerical 
risk estimates and subjective risk estimates on health-related behaviors, intentions, and 
recommendations. In other words, analyses will be able to reveal which type of risk 
perception is more closely related to behavioral intentions and recommendations: a numerical 
estimate, or a subjective interpretation of that estimate. Given previous research (e.g., Brewer 
& Hallman, 2006), it is expected that subjective risk estimates will be more predictive of 
behavioral intentions and recommendations than numerical risk estimates. 
 At the conclusion of the survey, participants were provided with relevant information 
about how to protect against melanoma and type 2 diabetes, and how to detect melanoma 
early through skin cancer self-examinations. Participants were then recontacted one month 
later to collect self-report data on performance of protective behaviors. 
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Increase in Sample Size 
Finally, in order to increase power, the sample size was more than doubled. To 
accomplish this goal, data was collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online service 
that allows businesses and researchers to post tasks for workers to complete for monetary 
compensation. 
Similar to Study 1a, the main hypothesis for Study 1b is that numeracy level will have 
a greater effect than worry on other-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates and 
behavioral recommendations for others, whereas worry will have a greater effect than 
numeracy level on self-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates, as well as on 
personal behavioral intentions, and self-reported behavior one month later. Additionally, it 
was hypothesized that any effects of numeracy level on behavioral intentions or 
recommendations would result in fewer intentions and recommendations.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred fifty participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
website, with the restriction that participants must live in the United States (as the “other” 
that was used for the study was the average American) and be over the age of 18. Participants 
were compensated with $0.75 for completing the first part of the study and an additional 
$0.25 for completing the follow-up portion of the study one month later. One participant was 
dropped from analyses, and thus not compensated, for not providing a valid completion code 
through Mechanical Turk, resulting in a final sample size of 149. The age range of this 
sample was 18 to 82, with an average age of 33.52-years old, with 62.4% female and 77.2% 
Caucasian.   
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 For the behavioral follow-up 87 participants were retained from the first part of the 
study. The age range of this sample was, again, 18 to 82, with an average age of 35.81-years 
old. This sample was 66.3% female and 80.2% Caucasian. 
Procedure 
 As with Study 1a, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
nontransparent vs. transparent presentation of information. Participants then followed 
procedures nearly identical to Study 1a. Participants began by answering two questions 
aimed to assess their level of worry about each health event ( = .78) and, following a short 
filler-task, their perception of numerical risk for the self ( = .61) and others (the average 
American;  = .82) for each of the events. They then answered questions about their 
subjective interpretation of their level of risk (r = .17, p = .04) and the level of risk for the 
average American (r = .43, p < .001) for both scenarios. New to this study, participants then 
answered questions about how much they were willing to pay for treatment related to each 
scenario, as well as how much they were willing to undergo genetic testing for each scenario. 
They then made payment and genetic testing recommendations for the average American for 
each scenario.  
Also new to this study, participants then answered a series of questions aimed to 
assess the extent to which they believed they would engage in protective and detective 
behaviors related to each scenario. And, again, they made behavioral recommendations for 
the average American. Perceived control over experiencing each event was then measured, 
followed by numeracy level, and then mood clarity. Participants finished by answering basic 
demographic questions. Measures not present in Study 1a are described below.  
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Materials 
Other-Focused Subjective Risk 
Other-focused subjective risk was measured using modified versions of the subjective 
risk questions used in Study 1a (e.g., “How at risk do you think the average American is for 
developing melanoma in their lifetime?”). Responses were provided using a seven-point 
scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all at risk) to 6 (Very much at risk). Participants responded to 
one question per event.  
Behavioral Intentions and Recommendations 
Willingness to Pay for Treatment 
 Willingness to pay for treatment, as well as payment recommendations for the 
average American were measured for each scenario using variations of the following 
question: “How much would you be willing to [recommend the average American] pay for 
treatment related to being diagnosed with melanoma [type 2 diabetes]? Please provide a 
dollar amount in the box below.” 
Willingness to Undergo Genetic Testing 
 Willingness to undergo genetic testing, as well as genetic testing recommendations 
for the average American were measured for each scenario using variations of the following 
question: “How much would you be willing to [recommend the average American] undergo 
genetic testing for melanoma [type 2 diabetes] susceptibility?” Responses were provided 
using a seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). 
 Protective Behaviors 
 To measure behavioral intentions related to protecting against melanoma, participants 
were asked to indicate how often they would do each of the following in the next month 
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when going outside on a sunny day for more than 15 minutes: stay in the shade; wear a hat; 
wear a long sleeved shirt and long skirt, long shorts, or long trousers; and, apply sunscreen 
regularly (adapted from the Sun Protective Behaviors Index; Cokkindides et al., 2001; 
Cameron, 2008). These same questions were used to indicate how often participants believed 
that the average American should engage in the aforementioned behaviors. Ratings were 
provided using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). 
Also adapted from the Sun Protective Behaviors Index (Cokkindides, et al., 2001; 
Cameron, 2008), to measure behavioral intentions related to protecting against type 2 
diabetes, participants were asked to indicate both how often they would do each of the 
following in the next month: engage in 30 minutes of moderate exercise five times per week; 
smoke cigarettes (reverse scored); eat three or more servings of whole grains (wheat bread, 
whole grain pasta, brown rice, oatmeal, etc.) per day; eat colorful fruits and vegetables 
(National Diabetes Education Program, 2004). These same questions were used to indicate 
how often participants believed that the average American should engage in the 
aforementioned behaviors. Ratings were provided using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 
(never) to 5 (always).  
 Detective Behaviors 
 To measure behavioral intentions related to detecting melanoma, participants were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they would do each of the following in the next month: 
carry out a skin self-examination, talk to a friend or family member about their potential risk 
for skin cancer, go for a clinical skin examination, check someone else’s skin for symptoms, 
and find out more about skin cancer. These same questions were used to indicate how often 
participants believed that the average American should engage in the aforementioned 
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behaviors. Responses were provided using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much). 
 And, also adapted from Cameron (2008), to measure behavioral intentions related to 
detecting type 2 diabetes, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they would 
do each of the following in the next month: assess their type 2 diabetes risk, talk to a friend 
or family member about their potential risk for type 2 diabetes, go for a clinical type 2 
diabetes test, assess someone else’s type 2 diabetes risk, and find out more about type 2 
diabetes. These same questions were used to indicate how often participants believed that the 
average American should engage in the aforementioned behaviors. Responses were provided 
using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
 In order to examine the effects of worry, numeracy level, transparency, and the two-
way and three-way interactive effects of these variables on behavioral intentions and 
recommendations, generally, responses to the above questions were standardized and 
averaged to create a composite behavioral intentions measure ( = .85) and a composite 
behavioral recommendations measure ( = .90). 
Perceived Controllability 
 For each event, participants were asked a series of nine questions for each scenario 
tapping into control risk beliefs (adapted from Cameron, 2008). These nine questions 
represent three factors of control, including personal control over prevention (e.g., “There is 
a lot I can do to prevent melanoma.”), personal control over cure (e.g., “If I get melanoma, 
the course of the illness will depend on me.”), and treatment control (“If I get melanoma, 
then it can be controlled or cured through medical treatment.”). Responses were provided 
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using a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) 
and averaged to form a composite control score ( = .82). 
Mood Clarity 
 Mood clarity was assessed using the mood clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood 
scale (Salovey et al., 1995). Sample questions include, “I am rarely confused about how I 
feel” and “I can’t make sense out of my feelings” (reverse scored). Responses to all 11 
questions were provided using a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) and averaged to form a mood clarity score ( = .91). 
Information on Protecting Against Melanoma and Type 2 Diabetes 
 At the conclusion of the online survey, participants were presented with resources 
related to the prevention and detection of melanoma and the prevention of type 2 diabetes. 
These resources included links to websites detailing how to prevent against melanoma 
(http://www.skincancer.org/year-round-sun-protection.html; Skin Cancer Foundation, 2010b) 
and type 2 diabetes (http://ndep.nih.gov/publications/PublicationDetail.aspx?PubId=76; 
National Diabetes Education Program, 2004) that participants were encouraged to follow and 
bookmark, as well as a handout describing how to do a skin cancer self-examination that 
participants were encouraged to save and print (Rigel & Carucci, 2000). The skin cancer self-
examination handout can be found in Appendix D. 
Self-Reported Behavior – One Month Follow-Up 
 One month after completing the initial survey, participants were recontacted via e-mail 
(containing a link to the follow-up survey) to assess the degree to which they engaged in 
protective and detective behaviors related to each disease. Questions about intentions to 
engage in protective and detective behaviors from the initial survey were readministered, but 
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modified to ask about the extent to which each behavior was performed over the past month. 
They were also asked to report on their worry about each scenario to see whether or not their 
engagement in protective and detective behaviors over the past month affected their current 
levels of worry. 
Data Analysis 
 The data analytic approach from Study 1a (multivariate multiple regression) was also 
used in Study 1b to examine the effects of transparency, worry, numeracy level, and the two- 
and three-way interactive effects on estimates of self- and other-focused numerical and 
subjective risk, as well as behavioral intentions and recommendations across the average of 
the two scenarios. Perceived controllability and mood clarity were included as additional 
covariates. Again, for each set of dependent variables, four different models were tested for 
the data: one containing only main effects, one containing main effects plus the interactions 
between transparency and numeracy level and transparency and worry, one containing main 
effects plus all of the two-way interaction terms, and one containing main effects and all 
interaction terms. Chi-square difference tests were used to identify the best fitting model for 
each scenario. Results are presented for the best fitting models only.  
In addition, linear regression analyses were used to test the effects of each of the 
aforementioned predictor variables, along with self-focused numerical and subjective risk 
estimates, on self-reported behavior one month later. Linear regression was also used to test 
the effects of protective and screening behaviors on current levels of worry. 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables of interest are 
presented in Table 4. Worry, numeracy level, control, and mood clarity were centered for all 
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regression analyses. Self- and other-focused numerical and subjective risk were centered for 
behavioral regression analyses. 
Again, multivariate multiple regression was used to examine the effects of 
transparency, worry, numeracy level, and the two- and three-way interactive effects of 
transparency, worry, and numeracy level on both self- and other-focused numerical and 
subjective estimates of risk, as well as behavioral intentions and recommendations. The 
results from the best-fitting models – for all outcome variables, the model containing only 
main effects – are presented in Table 5.  
Effects on Numerical Risk Estimates 
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between self- and other-focused 
numerical risk estimates remained significant, B = 134.88, SE = 31.86, p < .001. Beginning 
with self-focused risk estimates, there was a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-unit 
increase in worry resulted in a 5.03-unit increase in self-focused risk. There were no 
significant effects of transparency, numeracy level, control, or mood clarity. These findings 
support my hypothesis that worry would be more predictive of self-focused risk estimates 
than numeracy level. 
 For other-focused numerical risk estimates, there was a significant effect of 
numeracy level, such that a 1-unit increase in numeracy level resulted in a 3.88-unit decrease 
in other-focused risk. There was also a marginally significant effect of control, p = .07, such 
that a 1-unit increase in feelings of control resulted in a 5.94-unit increase in other-focused 
numerical risk estimates. There were no significant effects of transparency, worry, or mood 
clarity. These findings support my hypothesis that numeracy level would be more predictive 
of other-focused risk estimates than worry. 
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Effects on Subjective Risk Estimates 
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between self- and other-focused 
subjective risk estimates remained significant, B = .37, SE = .10, p < .001. Beginning with 
self-focused risk estimates, there was a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-unit increase 
in worry resulted in a .52-unit increase in self-focused risk. There were no significant effects 
of transparency, numeracy level, control, or mood clarity. As with numerical risk estimates, 
the hypothesis that worry, but not numeracy level, would be predictive of self-focused risk 
was supported. 
For other-focused risk estimates, there was a significant effect of numeracy level, 
such that a 1-unit increase in numeracy level resulted in a .15-unit decrease in other-focused 
risk. There was also a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted 
in a .15-unit increase in other-focused subjective risk estimates. There were no significant 
effects of transparency, control, or mood clarity. Although worry was not expected to be 
predictive of other-focused risk estimates, the significant effect of numeracy level on other-
focused subjective risk supports my hypothesis. 
The results for both types of risk estimates are, again, strongly supportive of my 
hypotheses. Worry was a significant predictor of self-focused numerical and subjective risk 
estimates, but numeracy level was not. This lack of significant effect of numeracy level on 
self-focused risk estimates again suggests that the potential benefits of numeracy on risk 
perception may be restricted to those who estimate risk for others. For other-focused risk 
estimates, numeracy level was a significant predictor of both types of estimates, whereas 
worry only significantly predicted other-focused subjective risk. Given the nature of 
subjective risk – that it is more of a gist-like representation of numerical risk – it makes 
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intuitive sense that worry would play a role in other-focused subjective risk but not other-
focused numerical risk. And, given that transparency did not play a significant role in 
predicting any of the four types of risk estimates, there is more evidence to suggest that 
transparent versus nontransparent framing of numerical information may be less important in 
terms of risk perception than previously suggested (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 2008). 
Effects on Behavioral Intentions and Recommendations 
After controlling for all variables, there was no relationship between personal 
behavioral intentions and behavioral recommendations for the average American, B = .01, SE 
= .02, p = .41. As a reminder, responses to behavioral measures were standardized before 
creating the composite measures, so results are presented in terms of standard deviations. 
Beginning with personal behavioral intentions, there was a significant effect of worry, 
such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .13 standard deviation increase in behavioral 
intentions. There was also a significant effect of numeracy level, such that a 1-unit increase 
in numeracy level resulted in a .12 standard deviation decrease in behavioral intentions. The 
significant (positive) effect of worry supports my hypothesis regarding its effect on personal 
behavioral intentions. It was also hypothesized that if numeracy level was predictive of 
behavioral intentions, this effect would be negative – the data also support this hypothesis. In 
addition, there was a marginally significant effect of transparency, such that behavioral 
intentions were higher when information was presented transparently, M = .09, SD = .54, 
versus nontransparently, M = -.05, SD = .42. This finding is the first piece of evidence that 
suggests transparent framing of health information may be more beneficial than 
nontransparent framing, specifically in terms of behavioral intentions. Interestingly, there 
were no significant effects of self-focused numerical or subjective risk – subjective risk was 
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expected to be predictive of behavioral intentions – nor were there significant effects of 
control or mood clarity.  
For behavioral recommendations for the average American, the pattern was very 
similar. There was a significant effect of numeracy level, such that a 1-unit increase in 
numeracy level resulted in a .08 standard deviation decrease in behavioral recommendations. 
In this case, numeracy level was hypothesized to be predictive of behavioral 
recommendations, and was, again, negatively predictive. There was also a significant effect 
of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .14 standard deviation increase in 
recommendations. This effect does not support my hypothesis. The effect of transparency 
was also significant, such that behavioral recommendations were higher in the transparent 
condition, M = .07, SD = .51, versus the nontransparent condition, M = -.10, SD = .60. This 
finding also provides support for using transparent framing of health information over 
nontransparent framing in order to improve health outcomes, here, behavioral 
recommendations for others. Finally, there were also significant effects of other-focused 
subjective risk and feelings of control, such that a 1-unit increase in each resulted in a .16 and 
.29 standard deviation increase in behavioral recommendations, respectively. There were no 
significant effects of other-focused numerical risk or mood clarity.  
The results for behavioral intentions and recommendations also generally support my 
hypotheses. While worry was expected to be predictive only of personal behavioral 
intentions, in reality, it was predictive of both personal intentions and recommendations for 
others, suggesting the powerful role that emotions play in various kinds of decision-making 
processes, regardless of the subject of the decision. Numeracy level was also predictive of 
both intentions and recommendations; however, as predicted, the effect of numeracy level 
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was to reduce behavioral intentions and recommendations. Although this was the only effect 
of numeracy level on self-focused judgments in this study, it is a very important one: higher 
numeracy levels are reducing participant desires to engage in protective and detective 
behaviors related to two common diseases. Given that higher numeracy levels are making 
numerical risk estimates for self and other more accurate by reducing these estimates 
(although not significantly so for the self), it logically follows that higher numeracy levels 
may reduce behavioral intentions and recommendations. However, the risk data provided to 
the participants reveal that the risk for each of these diseases is quite substantial 
(approximately 2.72% and 30.83% for melanoma and type 2 diabetes, respectively); the 
finding that higher numeracy levels are reducing behavioral intentions suggests that these 
participants are not sensitive to what levels of risk may warrant taking action. Therefore, if 
we are to increase societal numeracy levels – and thus make people more accurate in their 
perceptions of risk – through numeracy training, a necessary component to that training will 
be providing individuals with the proper context in which to interpret these risks, so as not to 
result in a lack of important protective and detective health behaviors. 
Also regarding behavioral intentions and recommendations, neither numerical nor 
subjective risk estimates predicted behavioral intentions; however, subjective risk estimates 
did predict behavioral recommendations for others. This finding is only partially supportive 
of my hypothesis that subjective risk would be more predictive of personal behavioral 
intentions and behavioral recommendations for others, relative to numerical risk, given that 
we are more likely to use gist-like, intuitive information when making decisions involving 
risk (i.e., Fuzzy-Trace theory; Reyna, 2004). It is currently unclear as to why subjective risk 
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was not predictive of personal intentions. This relationship – or possible lack thereof – will 
be explored again in Study 2. 
Emerging for the first time in this study were significant effects of transparency. The 
marginal effect of transparency on personal intentions and significant effect of transparency 
on behavioral recommendations revealed that receiving information in a transparent, 
straightforward manner resulted in higher behavioral intentions and recommendations than 
receiving information in a nontransparent, less straightforward manner. Although numerical 
risk perceptions were more accurate (lower) in the transparent condition, it is unlikely that 
this trend relates to the increases in intentions and recommendations. Not only was the effect 
of transparency on numerical risk estimates nonsignificant, but also the effect of numeracy 
level on intentions and recommendations was such that more accurate risk estimates reduced 
these behavioral measures, instead of increasing them as transparency did. Instead, drawing 
from the fluency literature, perhaps it is the case that the mere ease with which the 
transparent information was processed made the risks seem more plausible. Given that more 
fluent information is believed to be truer (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999), it is possible that 
participants were more motivated to engage in behaviors related to these risks, because the 
risks felt more real to them. Thus, it may be that receiving information in a transparent 
manner served to increase feelings of worry, and therefore behavioral intentions and 
recommendations; however, this possibility cannot be confirmed as worry was only 
measured before the health information was presented. 
Effects on Self-Reported Behavior – One Month Follow-Up 
 Again, hierarchical linear regression was used to examine the effects of transparency, 
worry, numeracy level, control, mood clarity, self-focused numerical and subjective risk 
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estimates (Step 1), the two-way interactions between transparency, worry, and numeracy 
level (Step 2), and the three-way interaction term (Step 3) on self-reported behaviors at the 
one month follow-up. Because participants were not asked about genetic testing or 
willingness to pay at the follow-up, the behaviors measure was calculated by averaging 
responses (not standardized) to questions regarding the extent to which they engaged in 
protective and detective behaviors. Only results from Step 1 are reported, as the change in R2 
beyond Step 1 was not significant. Results from Step 1 are presented in Table 6. As a 
reminder, 87 out of 149 participants were retained from the first part of the study. 
 The only significant effects to emerge from the above predictors were effects for 
worry and numeracy level. Replicating the effects for behavioral intentions and supporting 
my hypothesis, a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .15 unit increase in self-reported 
protective and detective behaviors, whereas a 1-unit increase in numeracy level resulted in a 
.07-unit decrease in these same behaviors. Interestingly, and not in support of my hypothesis, 
there were no significant effects of self-focused numerical or subjective risk estimates. There 
were also no significant effects of transparency, control, or mood clarity. 
 Regarding the effect of engaging in protective and detective behaviors on current 
levels of worry, the results were surprising: engaging in these behaviors resulted in a 
significant increase in feelings of worry, B = .88, SE = .18, p < .001, above and beyond the 
significant effect of worry from part 1 of this study, B = .54, SE = .07, p < .001. Specifically, 
a 1-unit increase in self-reported protective and detective behaviors resulted in a .88-unit 
increase in feelings of worry. Although no hypotheses were made about the effects of 
engaging in protective and detective behaviors on current levels of worry, this effect was 
somewhat counterintuitive, in that it seems more likely that engaging in healthy behaviors 
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would reduce levels of worry, because protective action had been taken. Following from self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967), however, it is also plausible that participants used their recent 
performance (or lack thereof) of these health behaviors to infer their level of worry. In other 
words, participants may have viewed their protective and detective behaviors as an indicator 
of their level of worry, with those performing more behaviors reporting more worry. 
Summary 
Overall, the results of Study 1b again suggest that numeracy level is not an important 
factor when making risk assessments about the self. And, in terms of behavior, numeracy 
level is playing a negative role by reducing motivations to engage in protective and detective 
behaviors. These data suggest the possibility that numeracy training programs will not only 
be restricted in impact to other-focused perceptions of risk, but also may discourage people 
from engaging in important, healthy behaviors. Conversely, this study has shown that 
feelings of worry increase motivations to engage in these health-related behaviors, making a 
more emotionally-based intervention beneficial in terms of increasing healthy behaviors. 
These two approaches – numeracy training versus emotional appeals – are directly compared 
in Study 2.
 CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 2 
 
 The goal of Study 2 was to explicitly examine the recommendation of Gigerenzer et 
al. (2008) to improve health through implementing numeracy training in order to change 
perceptions of risk. Therefore, this study compares the effects of a numeracy training 
intervention and an emotional intervention on risk estimates for the self and risk estimates for 
others, as well as on behavioral intentions and recommendations, and self-reported behavior. 
As stated previously, changes in risk estimates that have been demonstrated following a 
numeracy training intervention have only tested participants on their perceptions of risk for 
others (Gigerenzer et al., 2008). Unlike prior research, Study 2 not only examines the effects 
of a numeracy training intervention on perceptions of risk for the self, but also compares the 
effects of the numeracy training intervention to the effects of an emotionally-based 
intervention – specifically, the use of personal narratives and fear appeals – on self- and 
other-focused estimates of risk, as well as behavioral intentions and recommendations, and 
self-reported behavior. Again, with so much recent attention being turned to numeracy 
training programs and the potential benefits of numeracy training on health, it is important to 
know how such an approach compares to existing approaches (i.e., the use of fear appeals 
and personal narratives), especially when the former approach is more involved, likely more 
costly than existing approaches, and may, in fact, reduce engagement in healthy behaviors (as 
demonstrated in Study 1b).  
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While the numeracy training intervention was aimed at increasing numeracy levels, 
the emotional intervention was aimed at increasing worry. Increasing worry was chosen as an 
intervention goal, because of the potential to increase health-protective behaviors by 
increasing personal risk perceptions, which was also supported by Study 1b. This 3 
(Intervention: numeracy training vs. emotional vs. control; between-subjects) x 2 (Focus of 
judgment: self vs. other; within-subjects) mixed design allows for a direct comparison 
between two specific risk communication strategies on important health-related outcomes. 
 Similar to Studies 1a and 1b, I hypothesized that numeracy levels would have a 
stronger effect than worry on other-focused numerical and subjective estimates of risk and 
behavioral recommendations, while worry would have a stronger effect than numeracy levels 
on self-focused numerical and subjective estimates of risk, as well as behavioral intentions 
and self-reported behavior one month later across all three intervention conditions. Specific 
to this study, I hypothesized that the emotional intervention would produce significantly 
higher levels of self-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates, behavioral intentions, 
and self-reported behavior one month later, relative to the numeracy training and control 
interventions. Conversely, I hypothesized that the numeracy training intervention would 
produce significantly lower levels of other-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates 
and behavioral recommendations, as well as significantly lower levels of behavioral 
intentions and self-reported behavior one month later (as indicated by Study 1b) relative to 
the emotional and control interventions, but will not significantly differ from the control 
condition on self-focused numerical or subjective estimates of risk. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 96 undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill who were enrolled in an introductory social psychology course. In exchange for their 
participation, participants received extra credit toward their final course grade.  Given that 
the health data presented to the participants were applicable up to age 29, participants aged 
30 and above were not included in the analyses. In addition, participants were asked to verify 
that they had watched the video manipulation in full before moving on. Those who 
admittedly did not watch the video in full were not included in the analyses. These inclusion 
criteria resulted in a final sample size of 91, ranging in age from 18 to 22, with an average 
age of 19.73 years. The sample was 84.6% female and 61.50% Caucasian. 
For the behavioral follow-up 71 participants were retained from the first part of the 
study. The age range of this sample was, again, 18 to 22, with an average age of 19.76-years 
old. This sample was 87.3% female and 66.2% Caucasian. 
Procedure 
 As in Study 1b, melanoma and type 2 diabetes were used as the focal health events, 
and the dependent measures were largely unchanged. Participants accessed the survey via 
Qualtrics and were assigned to one of three conditions: numeracy training intervention, 
emotional intervention, or control intervention. For each condition, participants first watched 
one of three 15-minute lecture interventions (recorded using PowerPoint and narrated by an 
individual who was blind to the hypotheses), with intervention topic serving as the 
manipulation. Intervention topics included: 1. How to interpret health statistics (numeracy 
training), 2. Personal testimonials about melanoma and type 2 diabetes (emotional), and 3. 
43 
Understanding the Affordable Health Care Act (health-related control). All interventions 
were pilot tested before being implemented using a sample of 30 undergraduates recruited 
through an introductory social psychology class. After watching one of the three 
interventions, participants responded to the o, questions about the content of the intervention, 
worry about melanoma and type 2 diabetes, and the numeracy measure.  
Regarding emotional reactions to the interventions, the emotional intervention elicited 
significantly higher levels of guilt, sadness, and fear, relative to the numeracy training and 
control interventions. The emotional intervention also elicited significantly higher levels of 
worry, relative to the other two interventions. Although a significant effect was not detected, 
the numeracy training intervention resulted in higher numeracy levels (M = 9.10) than the 
emotional condition, (M = 8.5) and the control condition (M = 8.90). Importantly, there were 
no significant differences between any of the conditions on the extent to which participants 
found the interventions to be effective in conveying information, enjoyable to watch, vivid, 
interesting, understandable, engaging, or likeable. There were also no differences in the 
extent to which participants reported paying attention, caring about the information 
presented, or learning from the interventions. Detailed information regarding each 
intervention is presented in the next section.  
 Following the interventions, all participants completed a general emotion inventory – 
the mDES – to assess the overall emotional effects of each intervention, and then reported on 
their worry about melanoma and type 2 diabetes. Following a short filler task, participants 
were presented with scenarios and data similar to those that were used in Study 1b (the 
specific scenarios are presented in Appendix E), and asked to provide numerical and 
subjective risk estimates for both the self and the average college student. They were then 
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asked about perceived controllability, behavioral intentions and recommendations, and mood 
clarity. The last measure participants completed was, again, the numeracy assessment. At the 
end of the session, they were presented with the same take-home health information used in 
Study 1b. Finally, participants were recontacted one month later to assess self-reported 
protective and detective behaviors. 
Materials 
Interventions 
 Although the use of established and published interventions was sought and preferred, 
extensive literature searches produced little success. Therefore, the following interventions 
were created expressly for the purposes of this study. At the end of each intervention, 
participants were presented with information about melanoma and type 2 diabetes, along 
with information about how to protect against each in order to make the emotional 
intervention appropriately effective, as providing participants with information on how to 
alleviate their fear is a critical component of an effective fear appeal (Witte, 1992), and to 
account for the fact that the emotional intervention provided information about these two 
diseases, while the other two lectures did not. 
 Numeracy Training Intervention 
 This lecture presented concepts taught in previous numeracy training courses led by 
Gerd Gigerenzer, including “the illusion of certainty, single-event probabilities versus 
frequencies, conditional probabilities versus natural frequencies, [and] relative versus 
absolute risks” (personal communication, August 24, 2010). According to Gigerenzer, the 
most important message of his training sessions was that “the reason for their lack of 
understanding of health statistics is not inside their heads (or in their genes), but in the 
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misleading way information is framed” (personal communication, August 24, 2010). In other 
words, the goal of this intervention was to teach the participants how to translate 
nontransparent health data into a transparent format upon which they can then more 
accurately operate. The exact information presented in this intervention is based upon 
Gigerenzer (2002) and Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (2001). 
 Emotional Intervention 
 Drawing upon the fear appeals literature and the effectiveness of personal 
testimonials (e.g., de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008), this intervention presented stories from 
individuals diagnosed with melanoma or type 2 diabetes, paired with general information 
about each disease, in order to arouse worry in the participants. The personal testimonials 
presented in this intervention came from websites hosted by the Australian Government 
Department of Health and Ageing (2010), and Health.com (2010). 
Control Intervention 
 In order to provide a strong comparison condition, the control intervention was also 
15 minutes long and focused on a health-related topic: understanding the new Affordable 
Health Care Act. The exact information contained in this intervention was based upon the 
explanatory materials provided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(2010).  
Modified Differential Emotions Scale (mDES) and Manipulation Checks 
After the interventions, participants completed the mDES to serve as a manipulation 
check of the emotions evoked via the interventions. It was intended that the emotional 
intervention would evoke more fear-related emotions than either of the other two 
interventions. Participants were asked to indicate how much of each emotion (25 total) they 
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were experiencing while watching the intervention. Responses were provided using a 5-point 
rating scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Extremely). Also included were 10 questions 
from the pilot study to ensure that these interventions were not differing on the extent to 
which they were effective in conveying information, enjoyable, vivid, interesting, 
understandable, engaging, and likeable, and the extent to which participants learned from the 
intervention, cared about the information presented in the intervention, and paid attention to 
the intervention. Responses to these 10 questions were provided using a 7-point rating scale, 
ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). 
Data Analysis 
 The data analytic approach for Study 2 was identical to the approach proposed for 
Study 1b (multivariate multiple regression for numerical risk, subjective risk, and behavioral 
intentions and recommendations; linear regression for self-reported behavior one month 
later), with the exception that transparency was no longer an included variable (all 
information was presented nontransparently), while intervention type was added as a 
predictor variable. Also added for this study were manipulation checks to compare 
differences in emotions evoked by each intervention, as well as mean numeracy and worry 
levels across conditions. 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables of interest are 
presented in Table 7. Worry, numeracy level, control, and mood clarity were centered for all 
regression analyses.  Self- and other-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates were 
centered for behavioral regression analyses. 
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Manipulation Checks 
 To begin, one-way analysis of variance tests were used to test the effect of 
intervention type on emotions experienced during the video. Similar to the pilot study, there 
was a significant effect of intervention type on feelings of fear, F(2, 88) = 4.52, p = .01, such 
that fear was significantly higher while watching the emotional intervention, M = 1.73, SD = 
.74, relative to the numeracy training, M = 1.24, SD = .79, t(57) = 2.48, p = .02, and control 
interventions, M = 1.28, SD = .58, t(60) = 2.69, p = .01, which did not differ from one 
another, t(59) = -.23, p = .82. Contrary to the pilot study, significant effects of intervention 
type emerged on additional reported emotions. There was a significant effect of intervention 
type on feelings of sadness, F(2, 88) = 5.45, p = .01, such that the emotional, M = 1.80, SD = 
.96, and numeracy training, M = 1.48, SD = 1.06, interventions induced significantly more 
sadness than the control intervention, M = 1.09, SD = .39, ts > 1.94, ps < .05, but did not 
differ from one another, t(57) = 1.21, p = .23. There was also a significant effect of 
intervention type on feelings of awe, F(2, 88) = 3.76, p = .03, such that the numeracy training 
intervention, M = 1.69, SD = .93, induced marginally significantly more awe than the 
emotional intervention, M = 1.33, SD = .55, t(57) = -1.80, p = .08, and significantly more 
awe than the control intervention, M = 1.22, SD = .55, t(59) = 2.43, p = .02; the emotional 
and control interventions did not differ from one another, t(60) = .82, p = .42. Finally, there 
was a significant effect of intervention type on feelings of rejection, F(2, 88) = 3.23, p = .04, 
such that the numeracy training intervention, M = 1.38, SD = .98, induced marginally 
significantly more rejection than the control intervention, M = 1.06, SD = .25, t(59) = 1.77, p 
= .08, and the emotional intervention, M = 1.03, SD = .18, t(57) = -1.90, p = .06; the 
emotional and control interventions did not differ from one another, t(60) = -.53, p = .60.  
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In addition, unlike the pilot study, one significant difference emerged regarding 
intervention qualities: There was a significant effect of intervention type on the extent to 
which participants understood the information presented in the intervention, F(2, 88) = 5.92, 
p = .004, such that understanding was significantly higher in the emotional intervention, M = 
6.00, SD = 1.26, than the numeracy training, M = 4.86, SD = 1.60, t(57) = 3.04, p = .004, and 
control, M = 4.97, SD = 1.38, t(60) = 3.07, p = .003, interventions, which did not differ from 
one another, t(59) = -.28, p = .78. 
 Regarding worry, there was a significant effect of intervention type on worry, F(2, 
88) = 3.84, p = .03, such that those in the emotional intervention, M = 4.22, SD = 1.16, 
reported significantly more worry than those in the numeracy training intervention, M = 3.37, 
SD = 1.16, t(57) = 2.80, p = .01, but did not differ from those in the control intervention, M = 
3.84, SD = 1.20, t(60) = 1.27, p = .21; the numeracy training and control interventions also 
did not differ in terms of worry, t(59) = -1.54, p = .13. Regarding numeracy level, there were 
no significant differences among any of the interventions, F(2, 87) = .29, p = .75. Unlike in 
the pilot, the means were not in the expected directions, with numeracy level being highest in 
the control intervention, M = 9.19, SD = 1.75, followed by the emotional intervention, M = 
8.93, SD = 2.12, and then the numeracy training intervention, M = 8.79, SD = 2.41.  
Taken as a whole, it appears that the emotional intervention produced the intended 
effects on worry, but the effectiveness of the numeracy training intervention was not 
confirmed. Given the emotional reactions to the numeracy training intervention (elevated 
levels of awe, rejection, and sadness) combined with the lower numeracy levels and 
understanding, it is possible that these feelings of awe may have been the result of the depth 
of knowledge displayed in the video, whereas the feelings of rejection may have been the 
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result of their difficulty understanding the information. These data, then, suggest that the 
online video format may not be the most efficient means of providing numeracy training, and 
thus is not likely to produce any of the intended effects. Because the interventions were not 
fully effective, intervention type has been included as a predictor in all analyses, but the 
primary focus will be on internal analyses aimed at addressing the relative effects of worry 
and numeracy on self- versus other-focused judgments. 
As before, multivariate multiple regression was used to examine the effects of 
intervention, worry, numeracy level, and the two- and three-way interactive effects of 
intervention, worry, and numeracy levels on both self- and other-focused numerical and 
subjective estimates of risk, as well as behavioral intentions and recommendations. The 
results from the best-fitting models – for all outcome variables, the model containing only 
main effects – are presented in Table 8. 
Effects on Numerical Risk Estimates 
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between self- and other-focused 
numerical risk estimates remained significant, B = 150.64, SE = 37.37, p < .001. Beginning 
with self-focused risk estimates, and supporting my hypothesis, there was a significant effect 
of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a 4.86-unit increase in self-focused 
risk. There was also a significant effect of mood clarity, such that a 1-unit increase in mood 
clarity resulted in a 6.31-unit increase in self-focused risk. There were no significant effects 
of intervention type, numeracy level, or control.  
Also supporting my hypothesis, there was a significant effect of numeracy level on 
other-focused numerical risk estimates, such that a 1-unit increase in numeracy level resulted 
in a 2.08-unit decrease in other-focused risk. This time, there was a marginally significant 
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effect of mood clarity, such that a 1-unit increase in mood clarity resulted in a 5.35-unit 
increase in other-focused risk. There were no significant effects of intervention type, worry, 
or control.   
Effects on Subjective Risk 
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between self- and other-focused 
subjective risk estimates remained significant, B = .39, SE = .11, p < .001. Beginning with 
self-focused subjective risk estimates, there was a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-
unit increase in worry resulted in a .49-unit increase in self-focused subjective risk. There 
was also a significant effect of control, such that a 1-unit increase in feelings of control 
resulted in a .66-unit decrease in self-focused subjective risk. There were no significant 
effects of intervention type, numeracy level, or mood clarity. The significant effect of worry, 
along with the nonsignificant effect of numeracy level on self-focused subjective risk, 
supports my hypothesis.  
For other-focused subjective risk estimates, there was a marginally significant effect 
of worry, p = .08, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .15-unit increase in other-
focused subjective risk. There were no significant effects of intervention type, numeracy 
level, worry, control, or mood clarity.  
The results for risk estimates – both numerical and subjective – are very supportive of 
my hypotheses. Worry significantly predicted both self-focused risk estimates, but neither 
was predicted by numeracy level. For other-focused estimates, numeracy level only 
significantly predicted other-focused numerical risk estimates, demonstrating the narrowest 
range of numeracy effects of all reported studies. Worry was, again, a marginally significant 
predictor of other-focused subjective risk, replicating the effect of Study 1b and again 
51 
highlighting the importance of emotional factors in the decision-making process, even if 
these decisions are about others. 
Although the numeracy training video did not appear to work, as indicated by the 
manipulation checks, when only including intervention type in the model as a predictor, there 
was a marginally significant effect of intervention type, B = -.25, SE = .15, p = .10, on self-
focused subjective risk, such that subjective risk in the emotional intervention, M = 4.02, SD 
= 1.21, was significantly higher than the numeracy training intervention, M = 3.18, SD = 
1.07, and marginally higher than the control intervention, M = 3.52, SD = 3.14. The 
numeracy training and control interventions did not differ from one another. Because this 
effect is not present in the full model, it suggests that intervention type is not having an effect 
on self-focused subjective risk above and beyond the effect of worry (as the emotional 
intervention was expected to operate through elevated levels of worry). When only including 
intervention type in the model predicting numerical risk estimates, there were no significant 
effects. 
Interestingly, there were also significant effects of mood clarity on risk estimates. For 
self- and other-focused numerical risk, increases in mood clarity resulted in increases in risk 
estimates. Perhaps it is the case that the ability to make sense of one’s feelings may make 
general feelings and reactions to health-related information seem more real and/or 
informative when making judgments about personal and other-focused risk. It should be 
noted, however, that these participants are not likely relying more on their personal feelings 
of worry, specifically, as the result of higher mood clarity; post-hoc analyses did not reveal a 
significant interaction between mood clarity and worry on either self- or other-focused 
numerical risk. Regardless, these effects of mood clarity were not present in Study 1b, nor 
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were they further demonstrated in Study 2, so they should be interpreted with caution until 
replicated. 
Effect on Behavioral Intentions and Recommendations 
After controlling for all variables, the relationship between personal behavioral 
intentions and behavioral recommendations for the average American remained significant, B 
= .12, SE = .03, p < .001. As a reminder, responses to behavioral measures were standardized 
before creating the composite measures, so results are presented in terms of standard 
deviations. 
Beginning with personal behavioral intentions, and supporting my hypothesis, there 
was a significant effect of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .15 
standard deviation increase in behavioral intentions. Contrary to my predictions there was 
also a marginally significant effect of self-focused numerical risk, such that a 1-unit increase 
in numerical risk resulted in a -.01 standard deviation decrease in behavioral intentions, but 
no significant effect of self-focused subjective risk. Finally, there was also a significant effect 
of control, such that a 1-unit increase in feelings of control resulted in a .53 standard 
deviation increase in intentions. There were no significant effects of intervention type, 
numeracy level, or mood clarity.  
For behavioral recommendations for the average American, there was, again, a 
significant effect of worry that was not predicted, such that a 1-unit increase in worry 
resulted in a .12 standard deviation increase in behavioral recommendations. There was also 
a marginally significant effect of control, such that a 1-unit increase in feelings of control 
resulted in a .29 standard deviation increase in behavioral recommendations. There were no 
significant effects of intervention type, numeracy level, mood clarity, other-focused 
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numerical risk, or other-focused subjective risk. As a note, when only including intervention 
type in the model as a predictor, there were no significant effects on behavioral intentions or 
recommendations.  
For behavioral intentions and recommendations, the data pattern from Study 2 
differed from Study 1b. This time, there were no significant effects of numeracy level on 
either intentions or recommendations; however, the significant effects of worry did replicate. 
Across these two studies, it can be seen that if numeracy level plays a role in predicting these 
intentions and recommendations, then it does so negatively, suggesting that numeracy 
training programs that successfully increase numeracy levels may not be useful, or may 
actually be harmful in terms of engaging in everyday healthy behaviors. 
Regarding the predictive value of numerical versus subjective risk estimates on 
behavioral intentions and recommendations, the results did not support the hypothesis: 
subjective risk estimates did not significantly predict behavioral intentions or 
recommendations, while numerical risk estimates were marginally significant for personal 
intentions. So, while Study 1b suggests that subjective risk may be more important in 
determining behavior than numerical risk, Study 2 did not replicate this effect. Again, this 
inconsistent pattern of effects warrants further investigation, as determining which type of 
risk perception is more predictive of intentions and recommendations remains important and 
may help inform what types of interventions may best be suited for increasing healthy 
behaviors: those that influence numerical risk, or those that influence more gist-like 
representations of risk. 
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Effects on Self-Reported Behavior – One Month Follow-Up 
 Again, hierarchical linear regression was used to examine the effects of intervention 
type, worry, numeracy level, control, mood clarity, self-focused numerical and subjective 
risk estimates (Step 1), the two-way interactions between transparency, worry, and numeracy 
level (Step 2), and the three-way interaction term (Step 3) on self-reported behaviors at the 
one month follow-up. Because participants were not asked about genetic testing or 
willingness to pay at the follow-up, the behaviors measure was calculated by averaging 
responses (not standardized) to questions regarding the extent to which they engaged in 
protective and detective behaviors. Only results from Step 1 are reported, as the change in R2 
beyond Step 1 was not significant. Results from Step 1 are presented in Table 9. As a 
reminder, 71 out of 96 participants were retained from the first part of this study. 
 The only significant effect to emerge from the above predictors was the effect of 
mood clarity. Similar to the effect on self- and other-focused numerical risk, a 1-unit increase 
in mood clarity resulted in a .14 unit increase in self-reported behaviors. It is again possible 
that this is because those who are higher in mood clarity are better able to make sense of their 
feelings – their general reactions to the risks of melanoma and type 2 diabetes – which are 
then used as information when making judgments; however, as in the first part of Study 2, 
post-hoc analyses did not reveal an interaction between mood clarity and worry on self-
reported behavior. It is important to note that this effect of mood clarity was not replicated in 
Study 1b. 
Replicating the effects for behavioral intentions and supporting my hypothesis, there 
was a marginal effect of worry, such that a 1-unit increase in worry resulted in a .08 unit 
increase in self-reported protective and detective behaviors. There was also a marginally 
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significant effect of control, such that a 1-unit increase in feelings of control resulted in a .22-
unit increase in self-reported behaviors. Unlike Study 1b, there was no significant effect of 
numeracy level on self-reported behaviors in Study 2, again suggesting the limited effects of 
numeracy level on self-focused outcomes. Finally, contrary to my hypothesis, but replicating 
the findings of Study 1b, there were no significant effects of self-focused numerical or 
subjective risk estimates. There were also no significant effects of intervention type. 
Also replicating the findings of Study 1b, engaging in protective and detective 
behaviors resulted in significantly higher feelings of worry, B = .53, SE = .25, p = .04, above 
and beyond the significant effect of worry from part 1 of the study, B = .67, SE = .09, p < 
.001. Specifically, a 1-unit increase in self-reported protective and detective behaviors 
resulted in a .53-unit increase in feelings of worry. Again, as suggested in Study 1b, this 
finding is likely reflective of self-perception effects (Bem, 1967). 
Summary 
Although the results of this study replicate the general effects of studies 1a and 1b, 
namely the limited beneficial effects of numeracy levels, these results are not fully supportive 
of the hypotheses unique to Study 2. While the emotional intervention appeared to be 
working as expected, especially in regard to self-focused subjective risk, the numeracy 
training intervention did not have an effect on numeracy levels, risk estimates, behavioral 
intentions, or behavioral recommendations. The numeracy training intervention produced 
emotional effects that were not present in the pilot study, and thus not expected in the full 
study. Specifically, the numeracy training intervention produced greater levels of awe than 
both the emotional and control interventions, and also produced significantly more feelings 
of rejection than the control intervention, although these ratings did not differ from those in 
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the emotional intervention. Again, I believe that these elevated levels of both awe and 
rejection may suggest that participants were in awe of the statistical knowledge presented in 
the numeracy training intervention, but doubted their own ability to implement this 
knowledge, which could explain why mean numeracy levels and understanding were lowest 
in the numeracy training intervention.  
Regardless, it is clear that this numeracy training intervention was not working as 
intended, and requires additional editing for future studies. Specifically, it seems as though 
format would be the best starting point in terms of editing, such that an in-person, longer, and 
interactive format may be better equipped to improve levels of numeracy than an online 
video, making it more akin to the numeracy training program reported by Gigerenzer et al. 
(2008). Improvement of this manipulation is an important pursuit, as the results from Studies 
1a and 1b have demonstrated the need to directly compare numeracy training and emotional 
interventions on self- and other-focused judgments and decisions. 
Overall, however, Study 2 adds to the evidence of the previous two studies that 
suggests limitations to the effects of numeracy levels on health-related judgments, and even 
shows the most limited effect of numeracy level of all three studies – here, restricted to other-
focused numerical risk only. And, again, Study 2 showcases the importance of emotions – 
namely, worry – in the decision-making process about not only the self, but others as well.
 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Through the work in my dissertation, significant progress was made toward better 
understanding the roles that numeracy level and worry play in both self- and other-focused 
health judgments. Not only was the effect of worry demonstrated across all studies and, 
occasionally, across both types of judgments, the narrow range of the effect of numeracy 
level was also demonstrated.  
 In Studies 1a and 1b, the effects of existing levels of worry and numeracy were 
explored on self- and other-focused numerical and subjective risk estimates. In these studies, 
the effect of numeracy level on risk estimates was restricted to other-focused risk estimates, 
whereas worry consistently predicted self-focused estimates, and even spilled over to other-
focused estimates on occasion. Regarding behavioral intentions and recommendations in 
Study 1b, numeracy level and worry predicted both intentions and recommendations. While 
worry served to increase behavioral intentions and recommendations, numeracy level served 
to decrease these same variables. These effects were then replicated on self-reported 
behavior one month later. These negative effects of numeracy level on behavioral intentions 
and behavior are quite important, as these were mostly for everyday behaviors that positively 
contribute to one’s health, such as eating fruits, vegetables, and whole grains, and exercising 
regularly. Overall, Studies 1a and 1b show the beneficial effects of worry on behavioral 
intentions, recommendations, and self-reported behaviors, while also demonstrating that 
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numeracy level does not affect self-focused risk estimates, but does serve to reduce the 
degree to which participants believe that they and others should engage in healthy behaviors. 
 In Study 2, I attempted to manipulate numeracy levels and worry; however the 
manipulation of numeracy level was not successful. Despite this, the conclusions drawn 
about the roles of numeracy level and worry on self- and other-focused judgments echoed the 
conclusions of Studies 1a and 1b: While worry continued to predict all self-focused outcome 
variables, and even other-focused subjective risk and behavioral recommendations, the only 
effect of numeracy level to emerge was on other-focused numerical risk.  
These results, combined with the results of Studies 1a and 1b suggest that, although 
numeracy level may sometimes predict other-focused risk estimates, the effects of numeracy 
level on personal behaviors and intentions and behavioral recommendations for others are 
either nonexistent or detrimental in terms of healthy behaviors. These data show that relying 
on numeracy level and numeracy training as avenues through which we can improve health, 
generally, has earned premature and unwarranted support. Although higher numeracy levels 
may prevent people from pursuing treatment options that are suboptimal, higher numeracy 
levels are also serving to reduce motivations to recommend and personally engage in healthy 
behaviors. 
 Strengths and Limitations 
 A major strength of this work is that the general effects of worry and numeracy level 
were consistent across all studies, and even replicated across differing samples (i.e., a 
college-aged population versus a community sample). One finding that is particularly 
noteworthy here is the replication of the effect of worry across all three studies. In Studies 1a 
and 1b, worry was measured before receiving any health-related information, and thus 
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demonstrated the effect of baseline, or existing levels of disease-specific worry regarding 
these health scenarios on self- and other-focused judgments. In Study 2, however, worry was 
measured after receiving health-related information and produced the same pattern of results. 
This replication suggests that the demonstrated effect of worry may hold across differing 
sources of worry. 
These studies also addressed current weaknesses in the numeracy literature: the lack 
of consistent evidence regarding the effect of numeracy level on self-focused judgments, and 
the lack of direct comparison of the effects of numeracy level and worry on self- and other-
focused judgments. Given that most of us are likely to make estimates about and 
recommendations for other people from time to time, such as when we are providing social 
support, and that professions exist in which people consistently make risk estimates and 
behavioral recommendations for others (e.g., medical professions), a better understanding of 
the effects of numeracy level and worry across these different judgments is very important. 
In terms of patient-provider interactions, specifically, these findings carry great implications. 
While patients may be more likely to base their perceptions of risk and behavioral intentions 
on their feelings of worry, with more worry resulting in more behavioral intentions, providers 
may be more likely to base their recommendations on their understanding of the relevant 
numerical information – especially if they are taught to control their emotional experiences 
when doing so – perhaps resulting in fewer recommendations to engage in protective and 
detective behaviors. Although there remains a great deal more room for additional studies 
looking at the relative effects of numeracy level and worry on self- and other-focused 
judgments, these studies represent an important step toward better understanding the role of 
these cognitive and affective factors in the health-related decision-making process. 
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 However, these studies are not without some weaknesses. Regarding Studies 1a and 
1b, the lack of effects of transparency should be interpreted with caution. Despite several 
rounds of pilot testing, I was not able to find significant differences in accuracy of 
interpreting numerical information based on whether the information was presented 
transparently or nontransparently, and it is this difference in accuracy that would be expected 
to result in differences in risk estimates, behavioral intentions and recommendations, and 
behaviors. It is still possible, though, that the lack of effects of transparency could be 
attributed to a true lack of effect: perhaps verbal framing of numerical information doesn’t 
matter as much as previously suggested (i.e., Gigerenzer et al., 2008). Given the evidence 
demonstrating the beneficial effects of more transparent graphical representations of health 
information (e.g., Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Wright et al., 2009), a 
better manipulation for future studies may be whether or not numerical information is 
accompanied by a straightforward graphical display (e.g., an icon array). Certainly more 
research regarding the effects of transparency is necessary and important in order to better 
understand the factors affecting self- and other-focused judgments. 
 Regarding Study 2, the lack of effect of the numeracy training intervention was a 
major weakness. Although the emotional intervention appeared to be working as expected, I 
was unable to compare the effects of this intervention to the effects of a numeracy training 
intervention. Improving upon the numerical training intervention is an important next step in 
this program of research. Specifically, I think creating a numeracy training intervention that 
more closely mirrors that of Gigerenzer and colleagues (2008) is necessary. Given the 
constraints of the current study design – the online nature and comparison to a fear appeal 
intervention, in particular – it was not practical at this stage to create a 90-minute, interactive, 
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in-person numeracy training program. Not only would it have required a much greater time 
commitment from the participants, but also it would have been quite difficult to create an 
emotional intervention that was analogous in terms of length and active engagement. 
However, I still strongly believe in the importance of comparing the effects of numeracy 
training to the effects of fear appeals and personal testimonials directly, and hope to address 
this issue in future work. 
Future Directions 
 In addition to testing different manipulations of transparency and numeracy levels, 
there are other interesting next steps that I hope to pursue. Firstly, I am interested in 
exploring the degree to which numerical and emotional information is used in self- versus 
other-focused judgments by providing participants with either numerical, emotional, or no 
information about a disease, and then asking them to provide risk estimates and behavioral 
intentions or recommendations for themselves or an other. Given the results of my 
dissertation, I would expect numerical information to influence other-focused judgments 
more than self-focused judgments, and emotional information to influence self-focused 
judgments more than other-focused judgments. These kinds of findings would again speak to 
how best to present health information in order to improve health outcomes. I would also like 
to explore the continuum of self-other overlap in order to locate the point at which numeracy 
level becomes a significant predictor of other-focused judgments, as I expect the effects of 
numeracy level to decrease as the degree of self-other overlap increases. 
Despite the progress that has been made through this dissertation work, there is still 
much to be learned about the role of numeracy level and numeracy training in the realm of 
health-related decision-making across the self and others. Such work carries important 
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implications not only for how risk information is best communicated, but also for 
understanding and improving patient-provider interactions, where judgments about the self 
and others are happening concurrently. And, with additional research, perhaps we can come 
closer to understanding the ways in which we can combat serious societal health issues, such 
as obesity, by promoting the desire to engage in healthier behaviors on an everyday basis.
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APPENDIX A:  
EVENT DATA FOR STUDY 1A 
Melanoma: 
Transparent: MELANOMA (the most serious type of skin cancer) is the most common form 
of cancer for young adults 25-29 years old, and the second most common form of cancer for 
adolescents and young adults 15-29 years old. One out of 55 people will be diagnosed with 
melanoma during their lifetime. A person's risk for melanoma increases to 2 out of 55 if he or 
she has had five or more sunburns at any age.  
 
Nontransparent: MELANOMA (the most serious type of skin cancer) is the most common 
form of cancer for young adults 25-29 years old, and the second most common form of 
cancer for adolescents and young adults 15-29 years old. Approximately 1.8% of people will 
be diagnosed with melanoma during their lifetime. A person's risk for melanoma increases by 
100% if he or she has had five or more sunburns at any age. 
 
Car Accident: 
Transparent: There are more than six million CAR ACCIDENTS each year in the United 
States. Approximately 25 out of 100 drivers will be involved in a car accident in a five-year 
period. This risk increases to approximately 33 out of 100 for car drivers who use their cell 
phone while driving.   
 
Nontransparent: There are more than six million CAR ACCIDENTS each year in the United 
States. Approximately 25% of all drivers will be involved in a car accident in a five-year 
period. Car drivers who use their cell phone while driving are 1.3 times more likely to get 
into an accident. 
 
Genital Herpes: 
Transparent: GENITAL HERPES is the most prevalent viral sexually transmitted disease. 
There are more cases of genital herpes than there are all the other viral STDs combined. 
Approximately 1,000,000 Americans contract genital herpes annually, with 15-19 year olds 
making up 250,000 of these new cases, and 20-24 year olds making up 420,000 of these new 
cases. 
 
Nontransparent: GENITAL HERPES is the most prevalent viral sexually transmitted 
disease. There are more cases of genital herpes than there are all the other viral STDs 
combined. At least .36% of Americans contract genital herpes annually, with 15-19 year olds 
making up 25% of new cases, and 20-24 year olds making up 42% of new cases. 
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Type 2 Diabetes 
Transparent: Approximately 50 out of every 10,000 American adults are diagnosed with 
some form of diabetes each year, with TYPE 2 DIABETES accounting for about 45 of these 
diagnosed cases of diabetes (45 out of 10,000). Type 2 diabetes is a metabolic disorder 
resulting from the body’s inability to make enough, or to properly use, insulin. 
 
Nontransparent: Approximately .5% of American adults are diagnosed with some form of 
diabetes each year, with TYPE 2 DIABETES accounting for about 90 to 95% of all 
diagnosed cases of diabetes. Type 2 diabetes is a metabolic disorder resulting from the 
body’s inability to make enough, or to properly use, insulin. 
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APPENDIX B:  
 
NUMERACY MEASURE 
 
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is your 
best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a 
single ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
 1 in 100 
 1 in 1,000 
 1 in 10 
 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
 1% 
 10% 
 5% 
 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double that 
of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
 
7. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s is double 
that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease: 
 Out of 100? 
 Out of 1,000? 
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having what 
percent (%) chance of getting the disease? 
 
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005%. Out of 10,000 people, about how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 
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APPENDIX C:  
 
EVENT DATA FOR STUDY 1B 
 
Melanoma: 
Transparent: MELANOMA is the most serious type of skin cancer. Approximately 1 out of 
55 people will be diagnosed with melanoma during their lifetime. A person's risk for 
melanoma increases to 2 out of 55 if he or she has had five or more sunburns at any age.  
 
Nontransparent: MELANOMA is the most serious type of skin cancer. Approximately 1 out 
of 55 people will be diagnosed with melanoma during their lifetime. A person's risk for 
melanoma increases by 100% if he or she has had five or more sunburns at any age. 
 
Type 2 Diabetes: 
Transparent: Approximately 100 out of 300 Americans will be diagnosed with diabetes in 
their lifetime, with TYPE 2 DIABETES accounting for about 90 to 95 of these diagnosed 
cases of diabetes. Type 2 diabetes is a metabolic disorder resulting from the body’s inability 
to make enough, or to properly use, insulin. 
 
Nontransparent: Approximately 1 in 3 Americans will be diagnosed with diabetes in their 
lifetime, with TYPE 2 DIABETES accounting for about 90 to 95% of all diagnosed cases of 
diabetes. Type 2 diabetes is a metabolic disorder resulting from the body’s inability to make 
enough, or to properly use, insulin. 
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APPENDIX D:  
 
SKIN CANCER SELF-EXAMINATION HANDOUT 
 
 APPENDIX E:  
 
EVENT DATA FOR STUDY 2 
 
Melanoma: 
MELANOMA (the more serious type of skin cancer) is the most common form of cancer for 
young adults 25-29 years old, and the second most common form of cancer for adolescents 
and young adults 15-24 years old. Approximately 1 out of 55 people will be diagnosed with 
melanoma during their lifetime. A person’s risk for melanoma increases by 100% if he or she 
has had five or more sunburns at any age.   
 
Type 2 Diabetes: 
Approximately 1 in 3 Americans will be diagnosed with diabetes in their lifetime, with 
TYPE 2 DIABETES accounting for about 90 to 95 of these diagnosed cases of diabetes. 
Type 2 diabetes is a metabolic disorder resulting from the body’s inability to make enough, 
or to properly use, insulin. 
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Table 1. 
   Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among Variables – Study 1a 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 
1. Numeracy Level 9.09 (1.77) --    
2. Worry 3.67 (1.20) .003 --   
3. Self (numerical) 20.60 (13.58) -.18 .40* --  
4. Self (subjective) 3.29 (.83) -.04 .37* .46* -- 
5. Other (numerical) 34.36 (17.39) -.26* .14 .56* -.04 
                     Note. N = 70.   
                     *p < .05
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Table 2. 
Unstandardized Multivariate Multiple Regression Estimates of Numerical Risk – Study 1a 
 Self-focused risk Other-focused risk 
 B SE p B SE p 
Constant 20.73 2.07 < .001** 36.21 2.79 < .001** 
Transparency -.18 2.94      .95 -3.65 3.96 .36 
Worry 4.51 1.24 < .001** 2.26 1.68 .18 
Numeracy 
Level -1.36 .83 .10
~ -2.46 1.12 .03* 
Residual 
correlation 
(self, other) 
.54** 
Note. N = 140. Transparency was dummy coded (0 vs. 1). Worry and numeracy level were 
centered at the mean. 
~ p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .001
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Table 3. 
Unstandardized Linear Regression Estimates of Subjective Risk – Study 1a 
 B SE p 
Constant 3.24 .14 < .001** 
Transparency .09 .19 .63 
Worry  .26 .08 .002* 
Numeracy Level -.02 .05 .72 
         Note. N = 70. R2 = .14. Transparency was dummy coded (0 vs. 1). Worry and numeracy 
         level were centered at the mean.  
         * p < .01 
         ** p < .001
 Table 4. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among Variables – Study 1b 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Numeracy Level 9.17 (1.71) --         
2. Worry 4.06 (1.45) -.07 --        
3. Control 3.81 (.46) .18* .02 --       
4. Mood Clarity 3.78 (.77) .09 -.13 .21* --      
5. Self (numerical) 29.55 (22.41) -.07 .34** .04 -.02 --     
6. Self (subjective) 3.65 (1.35) -.03 .56** .03 -.10 .63** --    
7. Other (numerical) 30.80 (18.75) -.32** .03 .10 .06 .36** .09 --   
8. Other (subjective) 4.07 (1.12) -.22** .20* .09 .05 .28** .36** .55** --  
9. Beh. Intentions .02 (.48) -.43** .42** .01 -.14 .12 .24** .16 .26** -- 
10. Beh. Rec. -.02 (.56) -.21* .39** .16 -.07 .08 .25** .16 .35** .36** 
      Note. N = 149. Behavioral Intentions and Behavioral Recommendations were standardized. 
      *p < .05 
     **p < .001 
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 Table 5. 
Unstandardized Multivariate Multiple Regression Estimates – Study 1b 
 
 Numerical Risk Subjective Risk Behavioral Intentions and Recommendations 
 Self Other Self Other Self Other 
Constant 27.98 (2.44)** 29.09 (2.03)** 3.74 (.13)** 4.09 (.12)** .08 (.05) .06 (.07) 
Transparency 3.08 (3.45) 3.27 (2.86) -.17 (.18) -.04 (.17) -.13 (.08)~ -.21 (.09)* 
Worry 5.03 (1.20)** .06 (1.00) .52 (.06)** .15 (.06)* .13 (.03)** .14 (.03)** 
Numeracy Level -.81 (1.03) -3.88 (.85)** .01 (.05) -.15 (.05)* -.12 (.02)** -.08 (.03)* 
Control 1.84 (3.89) 5.94 (3.22)~ .09 (.21) .28 (.20) .10 (.08) .29 (.10)* 
Mood Clarity .40 (2.33) 1.27 (1.92) -.06 (.12) .09 (.12) -.04 (.05) .000 (.06) 
Numerical Risk -- -- -- -- -.002 (.002) -.002 (.003) 
Subjective Risk -- -- -- -- .03 (.04) .16 (.05)* 
Residual correlation 
(self, other) .37** .31** .08 
       Note. N = 298. Transparency was dummy coded (0 vs. 1). All remaining predictor variables were centered at the mean. Standard 
       errors are in parentheses. Behavioral intentions and recommendations were standardized.  
            ~p < .10 
        * p < .05 
        ** p < .001
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Table 6. 
Unstandardized Linear Regression Estimates of Self-Reported Behavior – Study 1b 
 B SE p 
Constant 2.27 .21 < .001** 
Transparency -.06 .12 .63 
Worry  .15 05 .003* 
Numeracy Level -.07 .04 .04* 
Control -.08 .13 .54 
Mood Clarity .02 .08 .77 
Numerical Risk .004 .003 .26 
Subjective Risk -.02 .06 .79 
         Note. N = 87. R2 = .24. Transparency was dummy coded (0 vs. 1). All remaining 
         predictors were centered at the mean.  
         * p < .05 
        ** p < .001
  
Table 7. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among Variables – Study 2 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Numeracy Level 8.98 (2.08) --         
2. Worry 3.81 (1.21) -.05 --        
3. Control 3.83 (.42) .20~ -.01 --       
4. Mood Clarity 3.56 (.67) .06 -.19~ .24* --      
5. Self (numerical) 28.77 (19.18) -.13 .27* -.03 .14 --     
6. Self (subjective) 3.58 (1.18) -.15 .49** -.22* -.04 .59** --    
7. Other (numerical) 33.33 (19.23) -.18~ .07 .16 .20~ .49** .14 --   
8. Other (subjective) 4.03 (1.00) -.12 .16 .06 .14 .14 .43** .46** --  
9. Beh. Intentions -.03 (.53) -.22~ .41** .36** .13 .11 .16 .24~ .32* -- 
10. Beh. Rec. -.01 (.59) .03 .27* .22~ .09 .17 .19 .16 .27* .60** 
   Note. N = 91. Behavioral Intentions and Behavioral Recommendations were standardized. 
    ~p < .10 
  *p < .05 
  **p < .001
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 Table 8. 
Unstandardized Multivariate Multiple Regression Estimates – Study 2 
 Numerical Risk Subjective Risk Behavioral Intentions and Recommendations 
 Self Other Self Other Self Other 
Constant 27.74 (4.98)** 30.77 (5.05)** 3.88 (.27)** 4.16 (.27)** -.04 (.14) .11 (.17) 
Intervention Type .57 (2.29) 1.27 (2.31) -.15 (.12) -.06 (.12) .01 (.06) -.06 (.08) 
Worry 4.86 (1.60)* 1.54 (1.62) .49 (.09)** .15 (.09)~ .15 (.05)* .12 (.05)* 
Numeracy Level -1.02 (.93) -2.08 (.94)* -.04 (.05) -.06 (.05) -.05 (.03) .01 (.03) 
Control -2.80 (4.74) 7.59 (4.80) -.66 (.26)* .13 (.25) .53 (.14)** .29 (.15)~ 
Mood Clarity 6.31 (2.99)* 5.35 (3.02)~ .21 (.16) .26 (.16) .07 (.08) .07 (.10) 
Numerical Risk -- -- -- -- -.01 (.003)~ .000 (.004) 
Subjective Risk -- -- -- -- .10 (.06) .06 (.07) 
Residual correlation 
(self, other) .47** .42** .53** 
       Note. N = 182. Intervention type was coded (1, 2, or 3). All remaining predictor variables were centered at the mean. Standard 
       errors are in parentheses. Behavioral intentions and recommendations were standardized.  
           ~p < .10 
       * p < .05 
       ** p < .001
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Table 9. 
Unstandardized Linear Regression Estimates of Self-Reported Behavior – Study 2 
 B SE p 
Constant 1.96 12 < .001** 
Intervention Type .04 .06 .45 
Worry  .08 .05 .10~ 
Numeracy Level -.03 .03 .24 
Control .22 .12 .07~ 
Mood Clarity .14 .07 .04* 
Numerical Risk .005 .003 .12 
Subjective Risk -.01 .06 .88 
         Note. N = 71. R2 = .28. Intervention type was coded (1, 2, or 3). All remaining 
         predictors were centered at the mean.  
              ~ p < .10 
         * p < .05 
        ** p < .001
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